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Introduction
A student of European history studies a Europe divided.I From Spain and
England vying for supremacy over the seas, to France and Germany's seem-
ingly endless border wars, Europe's history is a bellicose one, with nations
fiercely protective of their own territory, language, customs, and ideas. 2
But since the destruction caused by World War II, a new generation of
European nations strive for the benefits of more cooperation and less dis-
sent. 3 An increasingly united Europe gains more power and importance in
T J.D., Cornell Law School, anticipated 2003; B.A., University of Washington,
1997. Many thanks to Professor Kevin Clermont for his helpful comments.
1. When starting a story, recall the wise advice of the King of Hearts: "The White
Rabbit put on his spectacles. 'Where shall I begin, please your Majesty?' he asked.
'Begin at the beginning,' the King said gravely, 'and go on 'til you come to the end: then
stop.' LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND ch. Xl (1865). Begin here.
2. See JOHN REDWOOD, STARS AND STRIFE: THE COMING CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE USA
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 36 (2001).
3. See ANDREW DUFF, REFORMING THE EUROPEAN UNION ix (1997). Over the years,
the European Union has brought the great benefits of peace and prosperity to its mem-
ber states and citizens. It has restored democratic values in Europe. It has built a cus-
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world arenas. 4
The Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters ("Brussels Convention" or the Convention)
is a key part of the continued European integration. The Convention con-
cerns jurisdiction and enforcement of judicial decisions within the signa-
tory states. 5 The key to the Convention is that the signatories are
considered a single judicial system. Indeed, "discrimination and mistrust
toward a foreign court violate the spirit of the Convention." 6 The decisions
of a member state are fully enforceable in any other member state with
extremely limited, perfunctory review.
7
The United Kingdom is a signatory to the Brussels Convention. 8 Sepa-
rate from Europe geographically, historically, and ideologically, the British
often seem of two minds about a united Europe.9 They do not want to be
left out of the benefits of cooperation, but they are reluctant about the nec-
essary abdication of a measure of sovereignty that such cooperation
demands.' 0 For example, while on January 1, 2002 most of Europe gave
up its Liras and Francs for the common currency of the Euro, the United
Kingdom held fast to its Pound.I This British two-mindedness about the
European Union is clearly evident when examining the United Kingdom's
approach to the Brussels Convention.
A late signatory to the Convention,' 2 Britain remains a reluctant part-
ner, uncomfortable about the role of the European Court of Justice in Brit-
ish law making, especially in areas where the European Court of Justice
toms union and single market, negotiated major reductions in barriers to world trade
and established important aid and development agreements with the world's poorest
countries. It has improved environmental standards and helped the poorer regions of
Europe develop.
4. Id. at ix.
5. Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commer-
cial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1978 OJ. (L 304) 36 [hereinafter Brussels Convention or
the Convention].
6. Markus Lenenbach, Antisuit Injunctions in England, Germany and the United
States: Their Treatment Under European Civil Procedure and the Hague Convention, 20 Lov.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 257, 307 (1998).
7. Brussels Convention, supra note 5, art. 29. See Lenenbach, supra note 6, at
306-07 ("Implicit in the system is a Member States' high level of confidence for the
judicial system of any other Member State.").
8. Brussels Convention, supra note 5. The British joined the Convention at the
accession convention of 1978. Id. at 77, in ALAN DASHWOOD ET AL., A GUIDE TO THE CIVIL
JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS CONVENTION 239 (1987).
9. See REDWOOD, supra note 2, at 36.
10. Redwood comments:
There is a tug of love and hate in Britain about the EU itself. Whilst a big major-
ity of people do not want more government from Brussels, and are certainly
against Brussels taxation, the single currency, and the idea of sending our
troops into a war where we have lost the vote, there is also a mood amongst the
majority that we do not wish to be thrown out, we do not wish to take our bat
away completely, and we do need to trade with our partners and be friends with
them wherever possible.
See id. at 173.
11. See id. at 117.
12. Brussels Convention, supra note 5.
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maintains power greater than that of the United Kingdom's highest
courts. 13 While the letter of the Brussels Convention is generally followed
in British courts, literal interpretations of the Convention allow the British
courts to violate the spirit of the document and frustrate its purpose, while
ostensibly following its dictates.14
This Note examines the British courts' use of anti-suit injunctions
against other signatories of the Brussels Convention, and how this tool
exemplifies the British inconsistency between integrating into the Euro-
pean Union and maintaining a distinct British quality separate from the
rest of Europe. Part I provides the background of the Brussels Convention
and anti-suit injunctions, including when and why anti-suit injunctions are
used by the British courts. Part II explains more fully why British use of
anti-suit injunctions may be at odds with the Brussels Convention. Part III
argues that the use of anti-suit injunctions in the narrow context of enforc-
ing forum selection clauses is useful to maintain the integrity of interna-
tional contracts. Finally, Part IV examines how the British approach to
anti-suit injunctions illustrates Britain's delicate balancing of British quali-
ties and European qualities.
I. The Brussels Convention and Anti-Suit Injunctions
A. What is the Brussels Convention?
The Brussels Convention is "[t]he first international instrument to regulate
broadly jurisdiction to adjudicate in the international sense.' 5 The Coun-
cil of the European Union adopted it as a regulation in December 2000,
making it the official law for the Member States of the European Union. 16
The Council noted some of the general goals of the Convention stating:
Certain differences between national rules governing jurisdiction and recog-
nition of judgments hamper the sound operation of the internal market.
Provisions to unify the rules of conflict of jurisdiction in civil and commer-
cial matters and to simplify the formalities with a view to rapid and simple
recognition and enforcement of judgments from Member States bound by
this Regulation are essential.17
The Convention addresses both the "jurisdiction of courts in actions
brought in contracting states against persons-natural or judicial-domi-
13. See MALCOLM A. JARVIS, THE APPLICATION OF EC LAW BY NATIONAL COURTS: THE
FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS 424-25 (1998) (noting that courts of the United Kingdom
created guidelines for the exercise of discretion in referring cases to the European Court
of Justice [hereinafter ECJ], and that the House of Lords has made controversial deci-
sions to not refer certain cases to the ECJ).
14. See id. See also Lenenbach, supra note 6, at 310-11 ("The [English] Courts did
not doubt they had the power to grant an antisuit injunction, even under the Brussels
Convention.").
15. Arthur T. von Mehren, Symposium Article: Enforcing Judgments Abroad: Reflec-
tions on the Design of Recognition Conventions, BROOK. J. INT'L L. 17, 17 n.1 (1998).
16. European Union regulations have direct effect upon Member States. See Council
Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 2001 OJ. (L 12) 1.
17. Id.
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ciled in other contracting states" as well as "the recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments rendered in other contracting states." 18 The key
principle for conferring jurisdiction under the Convention is domicile, 19
while other ways to confer jurisdiction, including performance of a con-
tract or tort, are also available. 20
One of the most important aspects of the Brussels Convention is that
the drafters realized that:
[ijf judgments of other contracting states were going to be easily recognized
and enforced, then the specified bases of jurisdiction must be the only ones
permitted, and each contracting state must be prepared to give up-at least
within the ambit of the Convention-those bases of jurisdiction that other
states regarded as exorbitant (Art. 3). Contracting states were not required
to repeal the objectionable statutory bases of jurisdiction (Art. 4), but juris-
diction on these bases could henceforth not be exercised in actions against
persons domiciled in other contracting states. 2 1
Accordingly, the French gave up their Article 14 jurisdiction allowing
any French plaintiff to sue in a French court regardless of the domicile or
nationality of their opponent. Likewise, the Germans gave up their Article
23 jurisdiction granting personal jurisdiction over a defendant in Germany
if the defendant had property in Germany. 22 When the British finally
18. ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 423 (1993);
Brussels Convention, supra note 5, tit. I1.
19. Brussels Convention, supra note 5, art. 2; KETILBJORN HERTZ, JURISDICTION IN CON-
TRACT AND TORT UNDER THE BRUSSELS CONVENTION 51-53 (1998).
20. Brussels Convention, supra note 5, arts. 5-15.
21. LOWENFELD, supra note 18, at 424.
22. Id. at 424; Brussels Convention, supra note 5, art. 3. One of the most notorious
examples of this type of exorbitant jurisdiction is the Jean-Claude Killy underwear case,
where an Austrian court asserted in personam jurisdiction in a paternity suit over the
famous skier using an undergarment carelessly abandoned in a hotel room. This infa-
mous exercise of judicial power is memorialized in a less famous doggerel by David D.
Siegel.
Pack Up Your Troubles - Carefully
Why the gasping? Why so waxen?
What's the matter, Anglo-Saxon?
Don't you like our theoretical advance?
Don't you find cerebral pleasure
In the comprehensive measure
Of the things our law can do with someone's pants?
If our courts in sober session
Happen into the possession
Of a pair of drawers whose occupant fled fast,
We indulge the helpful fiction
That we've also jurisdiction
Over him whose fleeting form they covered last.
It is really a refinement
That we discharge this assignment
Only after he who owns the shorts has gone.
We would deem it much too bold of
Any sheriff to take hold of
Someone's garment while the poor chap has it on.
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joined the Convention, they similarly gave up granting jurisdiction based
solely on the defendant's presence in the United Kingdom.2 3
Another key provision of the Convention states that final determina-
tion of jurisdiction is left up to the court first seised of that particular
case. 24 This means that if a party first sues in an Italian court, and another
party to the case subsequently sues on the same matter in a French court,
the French court should defer to the Italian court in the matter of jurisdic-
tion, and allow the suit to go forward in Italy. 2
5
Along with these issues of jurisdiction, the Convention also addresses
recognition and enforcement of judgments among members. 26 The Con-
vention states that "[a] judgment given in a Contracting State shall be
recognised in the other Contracting States without any special procedure
being required. ' '2 7 In fact, "Article 34 makes clear that the Convention
expects very liberal enforcement procedures of judgments from courts in
other contracting states." 28
The Convention strives to create a unified Europe with respect to legal
decisions, founded upon simplified and explicitly delineated bases for
jurisdiction.29 It does not espouse the vagueness of common law jurisdic-
Take advantage of this power.
Should your marriage, say, go sour,
You could sue your wife in any land you please:
In advance, while things are peaceful,
just come tour with a valise full
Of her petticoats and female B.V.D.'s.
If you're threatened by our action
You may find some satisfaction
In advice we urge that tourists keep in mind:
No amusement will you lack here;
just be sure that when you pack here
You have not left any underwear behind.
David D. Siegel, In Vagrant Verse, in CASE AND COMMENT 56, 62-63, Sept.-Oct. (1971).
Unfortunately, the Convention's exclusion does not apply to any readers from non-signa-
tory states, so please heed the following warning: this form of jurisdiction could still
catch you. DASHWOOD, supra note 8, at 239.
23. LOWENFELD, supra note 18, at 424.
24. Brussels Convention, supra note 5, art. 21; Phillips v. Symes, 1 W.L.R. 853
(2002) (defendant claimed that the English court should not issue an anti-suit injunc-
tion because the Greek court was first seised of the proceedings). See also DASHWOOD,
supra note 8, at 32 (noting that Articles 21 and 22 of the Brussels Convention, concern-
ing deference to the court first seised of a case, were designed to avoid concurrent juris-
diction on related matters).
25. Brussels Convention, supra note 5, art. 26; see also George A. Bermann, The Use
of Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 589, 610
n.82 (1990). This concept is also referred to as lis pendens, or lis alibi pendens. See
generally Fernand Schockweiler, Lis Alibi Pendens and Related Proceedings, in CiviL JURIS-
DICTION AND JUDGMENTS IN EUROPE, 157-90 (Harry Duintjer Tebbens et al. eds., 1992).
26. Brussels Convention, supra note 5, tit. I1.
27. Id. art. 26.
28. LOWENFELD, supra note 18, at 425. See Brussels Convention, supra note 5, art.
34.
29. See ADRIAN BRIGGS, CIVIL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS 3 (Peter Rees ed., 3d ed.
2002) ("In civil and commercial cases, the new ground rule, the new basic law, is that
contained in the various European instruments: documents drafted in Europe, and being
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tional decisions, nor any extended scrutiny of a court's claim for jurisdic-
tion.30 The drafters strove to create ease of jurisdictional determinations,
and to avoid parallel, and possibly conflicting litigation.3 1 As the Council
of the European Union noted:
[iun the interests of the harmonious administration of justice it is necessary
to minimise the possibility of concurrent proceedings and to ensure that
irreconcilable judgments will not be given in two Member States. There
must be a clear and effective mechanism for resolving cases of lis pendens
and related actions and for obviating problems flowing from national differ-
ences as to the determination of the time when a case is regarded as
pending.
3 2
One may consider these to be lofty goals for a region as complex as Europe,
but the general intentions of the document are certainly clear.3 3
B. What is an Anti-Suit Injunction?
The United Kingdom was a willing signatory to the Brussels Convention,
yet English courts continue to use anti-suit injunctions against other mem-
bers of the Brussels Convention. The British position can be justified by
noting that the Brussels Convention does not outlaw anti-suit injunctions,
in fact, the Convention has nothing to say about them whatsoever. 3 4 There
is, however, an argument that English use of anti-suit injunctions conflicts
with the Brussels Convention's overall goals. 3 5 Does the practice of issuing
anti-suit injunctions disingenuously take advantage of inevitable gaps in a
document as broad and unprecedented as the Brussels Convention, bla-
tantly defying the general theme and intention of the document? Or is it a
clearly permissible activity because anti-suit injunctions are not specifi-
cally outlawed by the Convention?
The anti-suit injunction is an intriguing common law device. 3 6 It is an
extreme remedy, rarely requested and even more rarely granted. 3 7 It devel-
subject to the binding interpretive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities.").
30. See generally Brussels Convention, supra note 5.
31. Id. at pmbl.
32. Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 16, para. 15.
33. See Brussels Convention, supra note 5, pmbl. (stating that the drafters undertook
to simplify rules of recognition and enforcement of judgments, and to determine the
international jurisdiction of courts).
34. See generally Brussels Convention, supra note 5.
35. PETER STONE, CIVIL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS IN EUROPE 145 (1998).
36. See MICHAELJ. WHINCOP & MARY KEYES, POLICY AND PRAGMATISM IN THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 151-52 (2001) ("Like the stay, [the anti-suit injunction] functions in the man-
ner of jurisdictional challenge. Unlike a stay, it is not an act of self-denial in favour of
another forum. Rather it is an act of self-elevation in spite of another forum."). See
generally BRIGGS, supra note 29, at 364-94; DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
414-22 (Lawrence Collins et al. eds., 13th ed. 2000).
37. See DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, id.; see also GARY B. BORN &
DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS: COMMENTARY
AND MATERIALS 323 n.ll5 (2d ed. 1992); L.A. SHERIDAN, INJUNCTIONS IN GENERAL 66
(1994). Sheridan provides a circumspect description of the frequency with which Brit-
ish courts issue anti-suit injunctions: "It is repeatedly asserted that only with great cau-
Vol. 36
2003 British Anti-Suit Injunctions
oped within many of the different branches of the old English court
system.38
The anti-suit injunction has deep roots in English law. Traceable at least to
fifteenth-century England, the remedy first appeared in the form of a writ of
prohibition by the common law courts to the ecclesiastical courts to prevent
their expansive jurisdictional assertions. Later, the Court of Chancery
invoked the remedy as a means of preventing a party from bringing suit in
the common law courts under circumstances in which doing so would be
contrary to good conscience. Though initially directed at proceedings in
other English courts, the anti-suit injunction eventually was extended to pro-
ceedings in foreign countries. It is in that very different arena that the rem-
edy is now most commonly deployed by English courts. 39
One may use an anti-suit injunction when a party brings a suit in a
foreign court, such as Italy, and the other party believes that the courts of
another country, such as Britain, provide a more appropriate forum. 40 A
party may make a motion in the British court, arguing that the opposing
party should be enjoined from further pursuit of the suit in the other juris-
diction.4 1 The power to issue such an injunction "arises because the
enjoined party is subject to the in personam jurisdiction of the English
court."'42 A court will grant the injunction when it "must intervene to pre-
vent injustice. '43
Once issued, the anti-suit injunction "restrain[s] a party by injunction
from commencing or continuing to prosecute proceedings in a foreign
court. ' ' 44 The foreign court is not specifically enjoined-only the parties-
but the de facto invasion of the foreign court's jurisdiction by the anti-suit
injunction is obvious. 49 A statute granting this power to the English courts
states that an English court may issue an injunction "in all cases in which
it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so."4 6 This is a
highly effective and extreme remedy because all of the trappings of a tradi-
tional injunction follow with an anti-suit injunction.4 7 This means that
tion will the High Court impose an injunction on a party taking legal proceedings
abroad, but such injunctions are granted often enough." (citation omitted). SHERIDAN,
id.
38. See Bermann, supra note 25, at 593-94.
39. Id.
40. See Toepher Int'l GmbH v. Societe Cargill France, 1 Lloyd's Rep. 379 (1998)
(concerning a dispute about the condition of cargo load of soya bean pellets brought
before a French court, where the plaintiff requested anti-suit injunction from English
court to restrain defendants from proceeding in France).
41. See id.
42. Lenenbach, supra note 6, at 266.
43. Id. at 267.
44. STONE, supra note 35, at 144.
45. See WHINCOP & KEYES, supra note 36, at 151-52.
46. Lenenbach, supra note 6, at 267, quoting Supreme Court Act, 1981, § 37 (Eng.).
47. PRE-EMPTIVE REMEDIES IN EUROPE 301-02 (Nicholas Rose ed., 1992); SHERIDAN,
supra note 37, at 78 ("Breach of an injunction ... constitutes contempt of court, which
may call for punishment, deterrence of future disobedience or, especially when the obli-
gation is to do a single act such as handing over a chattel, coercion to comply. Commit-
tal to prison is the usual method of securing any of those three objectives. Punishment
may also take the form of a fine.") (citations omitted). See also STONE, supra note 35, at
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recognition of the injunction by the foreign court is unnecessary to ensure
the effectiveness of the anti-suit injunction, because if a party insists on
proceeding in the foreign arena after the English court issues the anti-suit
injunction, jail and monetary fines in England may quickly follow. 48
C. When and Why Are Anti-Suit Injunctions Issued?
English precedent somewhat curbs the discretionary standard for issuing
anti-suit injunctions outlined by the English statute.4 9 There are two main
categories of situations where English courts will issue anti-suit injunc-
tions: they will do so (1) "in situations where England is the natural forum
and the foreign proceeding would be vexatious or oppressive" (hereinafter
category (1) injunctions); and (2) "in cases where commencing a foreign
action constitutes a breach of a forum selection clause or arbitration agree-
ment" (hereinafter category (2) injunctions). 50
Regarding the first category, "the power has been exercised cau-
tiously"'' S by English courts:
[A]n anti-suit injunction should not be granted unless the English court is
satisfied that the continuance of the foreign proceedings would be oppres-
sive, and this normally requires that the English court should consider itself
the natural forum for the determination of the dispute, but also that the
continuance of the foreign proceedings would cause injustice to the defen-
dant there (as by substantially prejudicing his position in connection with a
related claim against a third person), and that prevention of the foreign pro-
ceedings would not unjustly deprive the plaintiff there of a legitimate advan-
tage. Moreover, owing to the absence of any sufficient English interest, an
English court will usually refuse to grant an anti-suit injunction designed to
prevent an English party from suing in one foreign court, where the appro-
priate forum is another foreign court. 52
146 ( "In the context of international commerce, the anti-suit injunction leads ultimately
to situations in which the operations of major multinational companies are brought to a
halt through sequestration of assets, and the imprisonment of the senior executives.").
48. Id.
49. See Lenenbach, supra note 6, at 267.
50. Id. at 322.
51. STONE, supra note 35, at 144 (stating with respect to the first category of anti-suit
injunctions that "it now seems to have been accepted that, in the absence of a jurisdic-
tion or arbitration agreement, it would be contrary to the Brussels Convention for an
English court to grant an anti-suit injunction against proceedings in another contracting
state in respect of a matter within the scope of the Convention.") (citation omitted). See
also Steven R. Swanson, The Vexatiousness of a Vexation Rule: International Comity and
Antisuit Injunctions, 30 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1 (1996) (arguing that U.S.
courts' use of a similar "vexatious" rule to decide whether or not to issue an anti-suit
injunction is improper, and more consideration should be given to international
comity).
52. STONE, supra note 35, at 144. See Airbus Industrie v. Patel, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 8
(1997) (various litigation proceedings were brought in Texas after a plane crash, Airbus
requested an anti-suit injunction in the English High Court restraining parties-English
residents-from pursuing their action against Airbus in Texas claiming that the actions
in Texas were contrary to justice, and vexatious or oppressive).
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This is a difficult standard to satisfy, and while anti-suit injunctions are a
rarity in general,5 3 those under category (1) occur even less often.
British courts take a different approach to category (2) cases concern-
ing breach of an explicit contract provision naming an English forum. 5 4
Indeed, "where a foreign action is brought in breach of an agreement for
English exclusive jurisdiction or arbitration . . . the English courts will
readily grant an anti-suit injunction unless the party suing abroad, even in
another contracting state to the Brussels Convention, establishes good rea-
son or strong cause why it should not be held to its contract. 5 5
A recent English decision outlined the standard for category (2)
injunctions:
Where a contract provides that all disputes between parties are to be
referred to the jurisdiction of the English courts, the court normally has
jurisdiction to hear and determine proceedings in respect thereof. An
English court may restrain a party over whom it has personal jurisdiction
from the institution or continuation of proceedings in a foreign court in
breach of a contract to refer disputes to an English ... court.
The parties to an exclusive jurisdiction clause are prima facie to be held to
their bargain. In an exclusive jurisdiction clause case it is prima facie
oppressive and vexatious to litigate elsewhere than in the agreed forum.
Where there is a valid exclusive jurisdiction clause the court will give effect
to it by granting an anti-suit injunction ... unless strong cause/strong rea-
sons are shown by the party in breach of the clause as to why an injunc-
tion ... should not be granted.
5 6
The English courts want to enforce the contractual reality voluntarily
created by the contract's parties, and consider violation of an exclusive
jurisdiction clause to be a considerable breach. 5 7 The English courts jus-
tify this standard by noting that without the anti-suit injunction, "the
claimant will be deprived of its contractual rights in a situation in which
damages are manifestly an inadequate remedy."5 8 Moreover, "jurisdiction
is discretionary and is not exercised as a matter of course, but good reason
needs to be shown why [jurisdiction] should not be exercised."5 9 The
English standard in this situation favors the non-breaching plaintiff.
53. See STONE, supra note 35.
54. See id., at 144; Stuart Dutson, Breach of an Arbitration or Exclusive Jurisdiction
Clause: The Legal Remedies if it Continues, 16 ARB. INT'L 89, 94 (2000) ("The English
courts have described cases in which the foreign proceedings amount to a clear breach
of contract as the 'paradigm' case for the grant of an anti-suit injunction.") (citation
omitted).
55. STONE, supra note 35, at 144. See Continental Bank v. Aeokos, [1994] 1 Lloyd's
Rep. 505; The Angelic Grace, Lloyd's Rep. 87 (C.A. 1995).
56. Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Peter Everett White (No. 2) [2002] I.L.Pr. 11, 104, 104
(emphasis added).
57. See id.
58. Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Peter Everett White (No. 1) [2002] I.L.Pr. 10, 85.
59. Id.
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II. Anti-Suit Injunctions: Problems and Controversy
Anti-suit injunctions are used only rarely in a narrow set of situations,
therefore, even courts familiar with the procedure can be thrown into con-
fusion when anti-suit injunctions come into play. For example, British Air-
ways Board v. Laker Airways, Ltd., involving parties from Britain and the
United States, demonstrates the confusion accompanying the use of anti-
suit injunctions.60 In that situation, the anti-suit injunction was followed
by a "counter-anti-suit injunction," and two common law countries had a
procedural stand-off across the Atlantic.6 1 The significance of Laker is that
the dispute involved two common law countries-relatively familiar with
anti-suit injunctions-and yet confusion and problems still arose. 62
If such a bizarre set of procedural circumstances could occur between
common law countries, imagine the potential chaos of an anti-suit injunc-
tion thrown into a civil law proceeding! A civil law court may not even
know that anti-suit injunctions even exist, let alone how they operate. As
noted above, a basic tenet of the Convention is that the court first seised
(the court first presented with the case) determines if it has jurisdiction
over the proceedings. 6 3 While British use of anti-suit injunctions against
co-signatories is not explicitly outlawed by the Convention, many argue
that it flies in the face of the doctrine of lis pendens.64
There is heated criticism of the British use of anti-suit injunctions
against co-signatories. 6 5 For example, Stone contends that it is clear that
English use of anti-suit injunctions is incompatible with the Brussels Con-
vention, and can not be used justifiably against a co-signatory, in any con-
text.66 Indeed, a British conflict of laws author notes that in cases where
60. British Airways Board v. Laker Airways, Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 413 (1984); Laker Air-
ways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
61. British Airways Board v. Laker Airways, Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 413; Laker Airways Ltd. v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909. See also Bermann, supra note 25, at
591-93. ("[T]he ruling showed that the prospect of further interjurisdictional impasse
was not to be dismissed. All in all, the protracted Laker litigation left observers puzzled
and disturbed by the vast anti-suit and counter-antisuit injunction possibilities.") (cita-
tions omitted).
62. See Bermann, supra note 25, at 591-93.
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. See, e.g., Hans Van Houtte, May Court Judgments that Disregard Arbitration
Clauses and Awards be Enforced under the Brussels and Lugano Conventions?, 13 ARB. INT'L
85, 92 (1997) ("Moreover, and even more essential, anti-suit injunctions do not fit into
the framework of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions .... Consequently, courts from
one Convention State should not interfere with court proceedings in another Conven-
tion State. In brief, anti-suit injunctions are fundamentally incompatible with the Brus-
sels and Lugano Conventions.") (citations omitted).
66. STONE, supra note 35, at 145 ("[T]here can be no doubt that it is incompatible
with the Brussels Convention for an English court to grant an anti-suit injunction against
proceedings in a court of another contracting state to the Convention concerning a mat-
ter within the scope of the Convention, whatever the reason for injunction may be. ...
For the structure, the detailed text and the various purposes of the Brussels Convention
indicate with unmistakable clarity that ... a court of a contracting state must be allowed
to determine its own jurisdiction, without interference by courts of other contracting
states."). See also T.C. HARTLEY, CIVIL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS 5 (1984) ("The Euro-
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the Brussels Convention governs the jurisdiction over a defendant, "[i]f the
proceedings to be restrained were commenced in the courts of [another]
Contracting State before the English court was seised, Article 21 of the
Convention[ I requires the English court to declare that it has no jurisdic-
tion if two proceedings have the same cause of action."6
7
A. Continental Bank v. Aeakos Compania Naviera:68 Two Perspectives
Continental Bank was one of the first cases to address the issue of an
English anti-suit injunction against another signatory to the Brussels Con-
vention. 6 9 In this case, a loan agreement between parties from England
and Greece contained choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses stating
that English law and English courts would govern related disputes. 70 The
borrowers defaulted and subsequently brought suit in Greece against the
bank.7 1 The bank requested and received an anti-suit injunction in an
English court before the Greek court determined whether its own courts
properly had jurisdiction. 72  This decision proved extremely
controversial. 73
Trevor C. Hartley and Andrew S. Bell are British commentators who
present different perspectives on the controversy and its ramifications.
7 4
Bell is critical of the English court's decision and argues that since all par-
ties agreed that the Greek court was the one first seised, the British court's
obligation was to respect the doctrine of lis pendens and not issue the anti-
suit injunction. 75 In the alternative, Bell argues that a British court should
at least stay such proceedings until the Greek court had made a decision as
to its jurisdiction.76 Bell also notes that
[t]he grant of the injunction effectively deprived the Greek court of this
opportunity, an opportunity which Article 21 strongly suggests it should
have had. This was an even more egregious interference with the structure
and operation of the convention than refusing to respect the decision of a
court of another Contracting State as to its jurisdiction. 7 7
Bell contends that the Court of Appeal's decision to uphold the anti-suit
injunctive relief in Continental Bank disrupts the structure and logic of the
pean Court tends to take a policy-orientated approach to the interpretation of legal pro-
visions. In the case of the Judgments Convention, it would pay more regard to the
objectives of the Convention than to the exact words used.").
67. DICEY AND MORRIS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 36, at 415.
68. 1 W.L.R. 588 (C.A. 1994).
69. See generally Andrew S. Bell, Antisuit Injunctions and the Brussels Convention, 110
L.Q.R. 204 (1994).
70. Continental Bank v. Aeakos Compania Naviera, 1 W.L.R. 588 (C.A. 1994).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 69, at 206; Trevor C. Hartley, Antisuit Injunctions and the
Brussels Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention, 49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 166, 170 (2000).
74. See Hartley, supra note 73, at 170.
75. Bell, supra note 69, at 206.
76. Id.; Brussels Convention, supra note 5, art. 21.
77. Bell, supra note 69, at 206.
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Brussels Convention. 78 In his opinion, "The spirit of co-operation implicit
in the Brussels Convention is seriously subverted where courts of one Con-
tracting State are denied the opportunity of examining their own jurisdic-
tional base by the courts of another Contracting State."79 Bell argues that
British courts exhibit dangerously interfering hubris by allowing anti-suit
injunctions to inhibit the jurisdictional determinations of the court first
seised.80
Hartley sees the situation from a different angle.8 1 He asks "whether
the institutional value of harmony between courts should prevail over the
more personal value of justice in the individual case. Most lawyers in the
common-law world would say that individual justice should prevail; civil-
ian lawyers, on the other hand, might see things differently. '82 Upon
application for the anti-suit injunction, the English courts determined that
England had jurisdiction, and that English law explicitly governed the con-
tract.83 Hartley states that "[iut followed from this that the Greek courts
ought to have declined jurisdiction under Article 17 of the Brussels Con-
vention, but there seemed to be no sign that they would do so. The court
therefore considered the injunction an appropriate remedy." 84 Hartley
argues that the use of the anti-suit injunction was a quick, effective and
appropriate remedy necessary to halt an expensive suit in a forum explic-
itly barred by the loan agreement. 85 In his view, the anti-suit injunction
was "[t]he only practical way of enforcing the rights of the bank... there is
no reason why it should be refused just because another Contracting State
is involved."'8 6
Bell's concern is with the effectiveness of the Brussels Convention as a
whole, and he worries that the anti-suit injunction undermines the Con-
vention's central idea of lis pendens-deference to the court first seised.8 7
Hartley, in contrast, considers the anti-suit injunction a useful tool to effec-
tuate individual rights.8 8 Hartley would argue that parties who negotiate a
contract provision should have that contract provision respected by the
court, and that whether a court is first seised should not allow it to main-
tain jurisdiction improperly. 89 Bell focuses on the spirit of the Conven-
tion, and the cooperation and respect he thinks the document necessitates,
while Hartley would contend that individual rights should not be sub-
78. Id.
79. Id. at 207.
80. Id.
81. See generally Hartley, supra note 73.
82. Id. at 170.
83. Id.
84. Id. Article 17 concerns jurisdiction agreed to by parties to a contract. It indi-
cates that the court first seised should cede jurisdiction to the court chosen by the par-
ties in the contract.
85. Id. at 171.
86. Id.
87. See generally Bell, supra note 69.
88. See generally Hartley, supra note 73.
89. Id.
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verted to the Convention. 90 Moreover, Hartley contends that the Conven-
tion allows this wiggle room, and the justice value at stake is worth the
possible inconsistencies that may result. 9 1
B. A Common Law Remedy in a Civil Law Context
The use of anti-suit injunctions against other Brussels Convention signato-
ries is further complicated by the fact that the anti-suit injunction has no
corollary in the civil law system.9 2 Lenenbach comments that "[t]o a civil
lawyer, some common law legal institutions are so alien they seem to come
from another legal universe."'93 The judicial discretion inherent in issuing
an anti-suit injunction does not exist in the civil law system.9 4 Civil law is
based upon a system of codes where judicial discretion is discouraged, and
the constant adaptation and fluidity of the common law system is alien.
9 5
The civil system thus considers common law remedies unpredictable, con-
fusing and upsetting to their system as a whole-and the Brussels Conven-
tion has many more civil system signatories than those from common law
systems. 96
As the particular example of anti-suit injunctions demonstrates, the
meshing of common law and civil law systems is not necessarily a natural
or intuitive process.9 7 Further, the ECJ continues to attempt to balance the
supremacy of EU law with deference to national processes and variations,
so the confusion caused by the shotgun marriage of these different systems
continues. 98
90. See generally Bell, supra note 69; Hartley, supra note 73.
91. See generally Hartley, supra note 73.
92. See Lenenbach, supra note 6, at 259; PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW,
PARTS I AND II xxiii (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 2000) (discussing some significant
differences between common law systems and civil law systems: "In civil law systems
there is a general and pervasive principle of good faith; in the European common law
systems there is no such general principle .. .the civil law considers it legitimate for a
contract to contain penalty clauses designed to deter a party from breaking the contract;
the common law regards the imposition of penalties ... as improper and unenforceable.
Differences of these kinds are inimical to the efficient functioning of the Single European
Market.").
93. See Lenenbach, supra note 6, at 259 (noting that to a civilian lawyer both puni-
tive damages and anti-suit injunctions come from a "foreign world").
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Rene Y. Nauta & GerardJ. Meijer, French Civil Procedure, in ACCESS TO
CIVIL PROCEDURE ABROAD 131 (HJ. Snijers ed., 1996).
96. See generally Brussels Convention, supra note 5; see also PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW, supra note 92, at xxii-xxiii.
97. See P.P. Craig, Report on the United Kingdom 195, 218-20, in THE EUROPEAN
COURTS & NATIONAL COURTS: DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al.
eds., 1998).
98. PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, supra note 92, at xxii ("One of the most
intractable problems of European legal integration is the reconciliation of the civil law
and common law families .... [T]here remain major differences between civil law and
the common law systems in relation to legal structure and reasoning, terminology, and
fundamental concepts and classifications and legal policy."). See GrAinne De Burca,
National Procedural Rules and Remedies: The Changing Approach of the Court of Justice, in
REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF EC LAW 37 (Julian Lombay & Andrea Biondi eds. 1997) ("There
is no single complete Community legal system, and there is as yet little Community law
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III. What Should Be Done?
This section focuses upon the issuance of category (2) anti-suit injunc-
tions, issued when there is a violation of a contract's jurisdiction or arbitra-
tion clause, because they represent a greater problem than category (1)
issuances.9 9 The test for category (1) issuance of an anti-suit injunction
sets a sufficiently high bar that its use against a Brussels Convention mem-
ber would be extremely rare. 10 0
A. British Options
1. Stop Issuing Anti-Suit Injunctions?
One approach to the problem of British use of anti-suit injunctions against
Brussels Convention members is to argue that Britain needs to completely
stop its use of anti-suit injunctions in this context. When the United King-
dom agreed to sign onto the Convention they also agreed to a concomitant
abdication of a degree of sovereignty.1 0 ' Indeed, one can argue that anti-
suit injunctions are just a school-yard bully's way of maintaining turf, and
that allowing a suit to go forward in another Brussels Convention state,
even in violation of an express contract provision, would not be extremely
prejudicial. Arguably, the signatories of the Brussels Convention are mod-
ern states with sufficiently similar ideas about contract enforcement, and
other important areas of law.10 2 Given that assumption, the question
becomes whether allowing a case to go forward in Spain would really harm
a British citizen? Indeed, some argue that there "is little to be said for arbi-
trary obstruction arising from judicial chauvinism."' 10 3
But this is an overly simplistic view of the situation, and ignores the
fact that British courts remain unlikely to cease to use anti-suit injunctions
against Brussels Convention signatories.' 0 4 True, the basis of the Brussels
Convention is deference to the court first seised, as well as deference to
that court's determination of jurisdiction, in order to foster predictability
regulating the procedural and substantive conditions for the grant of remedies at the
national level. Thus the potential tension between the core constitutional principles of
EC law and the specific procedural and substantive provisions of the national legal sys-
tems is evident ... it has at times appeared . . . that the autonomy of the national legal
systems will prevail over the effectiveness of Community law.") (citation omitted); Carol
Harlow, A Common European Law of Remedies?, in THE FUTURE OF REMEDIES IN EUROPE 78
(Claire Kilpatrick et al. eds., 2000) ("[Rlemedies in national legal systems differ consid-
erably . . . not even the minimal toolkit of remedies is common to every national
system.").
99. STONE, supra note 35, at 144.
100. Id.
101. REDWOOD, supra note 2, at 152. "A great deal of power has already passed from
Britain to the European institutions through successive treaties . .. transferring more
and more power to a centralised government in Brussels and the European Parliament."
102. See PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, supra note 92, at xxv. The Commis-
sion of the European Contract Law drafted the principles by drawing to some extent
from the legal systems of every Member State.
103. STONE, supra note 35, at 146.
104. See, e.g., Continental Bank v. Aeokos, [19941 1 Lloyd's Rep. 505; Toepher Int'l
GmbH v. Societe Cargill France [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 379.
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and uniformity of enforcement. 10 5 Nonetheless, in the area of contracts,
especially in the context of international agreements, clauses specifying a
particular country's jurisdiction for litigation and arbitration are incredibly
important. 10 6 These agreements themselves, formed voluntarily by private
individuals, create predictability and foster the necessary and important
creation of international contracts.' 0 7 Arguably, if these contract clauses
can be easily circumvented, the use of contracts in the international con-
text may be undermined. Therefore, the British court's use of anti-suit
injunctions for the limited purpose of enforcing contract provisions is not
unjustified, and indeed it can provide an important check on the entire
system of international contracts.1 0
2. Anti-Suit Injunctions and Freedom of Contract
In light of the above argument, a better question than whether Britain
should stop issuing anti-suit injunctions is: why courts in countries that
are parties to the Brussels Convention do not acknowledge or enforce con-
tract provisions that specify another court as the proper forum?' 0 9 One
could argue that taking jurisdiction contrary to an explicit jurisdiction
clause is a harsher example of "arbitrary obstruction arising from judicial
chauvinism"' 10 than a British court's issuance of an anti-suit injunction
against such an action. While deference to the court first-seised is impor-
tant, ancient principles of contract enforcement, especially in the interna-
tional arena, arguably should be at least as important. Parties have the
freedom to shape their legal world through contracts-within acceptable
boundaries-and the world they create through their contract should be
enforced to the fullest extent possible.t This right should not be ignored
or diluted.'' 2
Indeed, British courts strive to enforce the original intent of con-
tracting parties, and hold them to their bargain-pacta sunt servanda. In
Donohue v. Armco, 1 13 a party sought an anti-suit injunction from the
English court to prevent an opposing party from suing in any other
105. Id.
106. LOVWENFELD, supra note 18, at 327.
107. See DONALD HARRIS, DA\'ID CAMPBELL & ROGER HALSON, REMEDIES IN CONTRACT &
TORT 6-7 (2d. ed. 2001) ("[Tlhe law of contract has proven to be a necessary institu-
tional support for the capitalist economies based on generalised exchange, by providing
the security to [the claimant] of being able ultimately to obtain a legally enforceable
remedy against [the defendant] when [the defendant] breaches by failing to perform
without a lawful excuse. The law of contract provides a framework within which parties
can, if they wish, turn their voluntary agreement into a binding arrangement subject to
external sanction . . . The law thus enables the parties to make arrangements which are
ultimately much more reliable than those which depend exclusively on sanctions within
their own control.").
108. See generally Hartley, supra note 73.
109. See, e.g., Continental Bank v. Aeokos, [1994] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 505; Toepher Int'l
GmbH v. Societe Cargill France, [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 379.
110. STONE, supra note 35, at 146.
111. See supra note 107.
112. PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, supra note 92, art. 1:102.
113. Donohue v. Armco, [2000] I.L.Pr. 321.
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forum. 1 1 4 Suit had been brought in New York, in alleged violation of an
exclusive jurisdiction clause in the disputed contract. 1 5 The English court
noted:
If parties do not submit disputes that are within the [exclusive jurisdiction]
clause to the English courts then, on the face of it, they are infringing the
other parties' legal rights. The English court's general approach is to enforce
those contractual agreements unless there is good reason not to do so....
The burden of establishing a good reason for not granting an injunction in
the case of an arbitration clause or an [exclusive jurisdiction clause] is upon
the party in breach of the clause. 1 1 6
Freedom of contract may seem to be a facile flag that is waved in the
face of many an evil. There exists, however, a reason that this concept is so
common to modern Western legal systems-it helps legal systems work,
especially the international legal system. 1 7 In fact, the Commission of
European Contract Law, "a body of lawyers drawn from all the member
States of the European Union" which drafted the Principles of European
Contract, strongly support this notion. 1 8 The Commission's Principles
clearly support freedom of contract stating that "parties are free to enter
into a contract and to determine its contents, subject to the requirements of
good faith and fair dealing."' 1 9 Moreover, "the Principles acknowledge the
rights of the citizens and their enterprises to decide with whom they will
make their contracts and determine the contents of these contracts. ' ' 120
As such, the British use of anti-suit injunctions in category (2) con-
tract situations proves to be in harmony with the predictability goal of the
Brussels Convention. It is clear that British courts will issue such an
injunction to enjoin parties from violating a contract clause citing Britain
as the proper forum for resolution of disputes. It is easy to predict when a
British court will act in this situation. Predictability is in fact undermined,
when a court refuses to acknowledge an explicit jurisdiction or arbitration
clause.
B. The European Court of Justice and The Hague Reaction to British
Anti-Suit Injunctions
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) will probably determine the fate of
Britain's use of anti-suit injunctions against other contracting members of
the Brussels Convention. The House of Lords recently referred a case con-
cerning anti-suit injunctions to that court. 12 1
In Turner v. Grovit parallel proceedings were brought in Spain against
the plaintiff in an English case. 1 22 The plaintiff sought an anti-suit injunc-
114. Id. at 322.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 333.
117. See, e.g., LOWENFELD, supra note 18, at 327.
118. PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, supra note 92, at xxi.
119. Id. art. 1:102.
120. Id. art. 1:102, comment.
121. See Turner v. Grovit, 1 W.L.R. 107 (2002).
122. Id.
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tion to prevent the proceedings in Spain arguing that the Spanish litigation
was solely meant to harass.123 On appeal, the House of Lords determined
that under English Law the anti-suit injunction was proper, but referred the
question of whether the order was proper under the Brussels Convention to
the European Court of Justice. 1 24 The ECJ has yet to rule on the issue. 125
It should be noted that the ECJ ruling will probably not resolve the
broad issue of whether anti-suit injunctions may be issued by England.
The Turner case concerns category (1) anti-suit injunctions, the category
that most English courts agree constitutes improper use of the anti-suit
injunction.' 26 Category (2) anti-suit injunctions, those that British courts
issue much more frequently, will not be addressed by the ECJ in this case.
Indeed, the question that House of Lords posed to the ECJ narrowly asks
whether issuing an anti-suit injunction is proper against "defendants who
are threatening to commence or continue legal proceedings in another Con-
vention country when those defendants are acting in bad faith with the
intent and purpose of frustrating or obstructing proceedings properly
before the English courts?"'12 7 The ECJ answer to this carefully phrased
query will be unlikely to sound the death knell of anti-suit injunctions.
Some commentators contend that the ECJ is likely to be hostile to Brit-
ish use of anti-suit injunctions. Bell argues that "it is difficult to imagine
that the European Court of Justice would be sympathetic to the use of a
jurisdictional weapon such as the anti-suit injunction which has the poten-
tial to overpower the allocation of jurisdiction which the Brussels Conven-
tion enshrines."' 128 Hartley notes that the ECJ's decision in this area is
impossible to predict, but he agrees that "[s]ome members of the Court
would certainly regard the political goal of institutional harmony as para-
mount: the European Court has not so far been conspicuous for its zeal in
protecting the rights of the individual where they conflict with institutional
interests."1 29  Hartley indicates that the particular facts of the case
presented to the ECJ would prove very important in determining the
Court's decision on this issue.130 The Turner situation supports this last
123. Id.
124. Id.; Reference for a preliminary ruling by the House of Lords by order of that
court dated 13 December 2001, in the case of Gregory Paul Turner against 1) Felix
Fareed Ismail Grovit, 2) Harada Ltd., 3) Changepoint S.A., (Case C-159/02), [2002 OJ
C169/32] [hereinafter Preliminary Ruling Turner]; see generallyJARvIs, supra note 13, at
420-30 (regarding the process of preliminary references to the ECJ by a national court).
125. See JARVIS, supra note 13, at 427 (noting that a preliminary reference to the ECJ
often takes between 18 and 20 months).
126. See supra note 52 (noting that category (1) anti-suit injunctions to prevent suits
that are "vexatious or oppressive" are issued less frequently than category (2) anti-suit
injunctions issued to enforce a forum selection clause).
127. Preliminary Ruling Turner, supra note 124.
128. Bell, supra note 69, at 209.
129. Hartley, supra note 73, at 170.
130. Id. Hartley argues that on the facts of Continental Bank "the justice of the case is
so strongly in favour of the injunction that it is hard to believe the European Court
would not be influenced by it."
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statement, because no matter how hostile the ECJ may be to anti-suit
injunctions, that court can only answer the question posed to it.
While the ECJ is unlikely to reach a final decision regarding anti-suit
injunctions any time soon, the proposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction
and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters attempts to fill
some of the gaps left by the Brussels Convention, including the Conven-
tion's failure to directly address anti-suit injunctions. 131 Some of the draft-
ers of the Hague Convention admit that there may be a limited role for anti-
suit injunctions that enjoin actions begun in another forum solely to be
vexatious or to wear down the opponent. 13 2 Many other participants at the
Hague negotiations, however, consider anti-suit injunctions to be an
infringement on territorial sovereignty.' 33 While the negotiations may
prove very difficult, contracting states would benefit from creating agreed
upon rules regarding anti-suit injunctions, instead of submitting to a world
without any determinative rules.' 34
IV. Anti-Suit Injunctions: A Glimpse at the British Psyche?
One could argue that the solution outlined in Section III, supra, of this Note
just begs the question of genuine British involvement in further European
integration, A good argument can be made that use of the anti-suit injunc-
tion, in any form or situation, is not what the drafters and other signatories
of the Brussels Convention had in mind.1 35 Recall that the Brussels Con-
vention addresses enforcement as well as jurisdiction.' 36 That means that
when an English court issues an anti-suit injunction, the other Member
States must also uphold it. Moreover, even if a Member State refuses to
recognize the anti-suit injunction under the narrow public policy loophole
of the Convention,' 3 7 we swing around a vicious circle: the basic premise
of the Convention is again undermined-common recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments. Some argue that the United Kingdom just creates
unnecessary complications with its anti-suit injunction shenanigans, and
should decide to become genuinely involved in the EU and its related
agreements, or not. 13
8
The British, however, seem very content to maintain their unpopular
stance by continuing to enforce anti-suit injunctions. Ostensibly, "it is not
easy wholly to banish antisuit injunctions from a legal culture accustomed
131. See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, The Proposed Hague Conven-
tion and Progress in National Law, 49 Am. J. COMP. L. 203, 219-26 (2001).
132. Id. at 226; see generally Hartley, supra note 73; see also Preliminary Ruling Tur-
ner, supra note 124.
133. Burbank, supra note 131, at 226.
134. Id. at 226.
135. See generally Brussels Convention, supra note 5.
136. Id. tits. I & Ill.
137. Id. art. 27.
138. See DUFF, supra note 3, at xi ("It would be bizarre now for the British to fail to
deepen solidarity with a liberal and democratic Europe. But in order to make such a
positive contribution the British have got to change their attitude towards the
continent.").
Vol. 36
2003 British Anti-Suit Injunctions
to them."' 39 Dicta in one English judgment in 1996 suggested that "the
problem of anti-suit injunctions between EC countries might be solved by a
Directive in favour of their recognition!"' 40
The problem therefore, is that Britain does not have to "play nice" if it
does not want to "play nice." Britain seems unsure about a united Europe,
and it remains content to walk the line that geography, history, and the
dynamics of political power continue to grant them. 14' While the march
toward further European integration may seem inevitable, 142 many British
remain "Eurosceptics."'143 Either consciously or unconsciously, Britain's
continued use of anti-suit injunctions against Convention members is a
direct manifestation of that skepticism. The British believe that they enjoy
a special relationship with the United States, and are not necessarily will-
ing to put a "European" relationship ahead of their relationship with the
most powerful nation in the world. 144 Moreover, many British would argue
that they have a "fundamentally different approach to nationhood and sov-
ereignty"14 5 than the rest of Europe. In fact,
All British governments, whether right, left or centre, do believe that most
important decisions about British life should be taken by the British govern-
ment and debated in the British Parliament. All British governments find it
difficult to square this with a strong and deeply felt wish on the part of
continental politicians for more and more decisions to be taken by a bureau-
cracy in Brussels and not put through their own domestic parliaments.' 4 6
Yet despite all of their ambivalence and even hostility towards further
integration with continental Europe, Britain did indeed cede a great deal of
sovereignty to the European Union, and a great deal of their common law
British rules to the Brussels Convention. 147 Therefore, the maintenance of
the anti-suit injunction, besides providing legitimate support for freedom
of contract, may also be seen as a manifestation of "a fine-tuned legal bal-
ance between the requirements of European integration and state sover-
eignty."' 148 As one British subject notes: "we are also an island people. We
139. Burbank, supra note 131, at 225-26.
140. STONE, supra note 35, at 168, citing Phillip Alexander Securities v. Bamberger, 12
July 1996 (noting that in this case the English court stated that the anti-suit injunction
granted was based on an incorrect understanding of the situation, yet the judgment still
advocated broad recognition of anti-suit injunctions).
141. J.H.H. Weiler et al., Prologue - The European Courts of Justice vi, xi-xii, in THE
EUROPEAN COURTS & NATIONAL COURTS: DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE (Anne-Marie
Slaughter et al. eds., 1998).
142. See DUFF, supra note 3, at ix-x ("The twenty-first century could be the first to see
the peaceful unification of Europe .... We take the view that the European Commission
must become both stronger and more accountable .... Such reforms will reinforce the
federal element in the makeup of the European Union.").
143. REDWOOD, supra note 2, at 57; see DUFF, supra note 3, at xi.
144. REDWOOD, supra note 2, at 3.
145. Id. at 57.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 152.
148. Bruno De Witte, Sovereignty and European Integration: the Weight of Legal Tradi-
tion, 277, 292 in THE EUROPEAN COURTS & NATIONAL COURTS: DOCTRINE AND JURISPRU-
DENCE (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al. eds., 1998).
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take pride in our centuries-long success as an independent country."' 4 9
Anti-suit injunctions do not violate any specific provisions on the Brussels
Convention, and their continued use may be seen as a way for Britain to
continue to assert its unique qualities.
Conclusion
The British anti-suit injunction is alien to the other signatories of the Brus-
sels Convention, but the principles behind why a British court will issue an
anti-suit injunction to enjoin parties from proceeding in a foreign court
against the express provisions of a contract clause are not alien to those
other signatories. Parties have freedom to contract, and freely negotiated
contract provisions should be upheld. If they are not upheld, a British
court should be free, in this clearly defined context, to try to enforce those
contract provisions through use of an anti-suit injunction.
Moreover, while use of anti-suit injunctions may often be justified on
freedom of contract grounds, it may also be viewed as a completely legal
way that the British can continue to be themselves in the increasingly civil
law atmosphere of Europe. Britain is European, but it is also separate from
Europe. While a desire for neat and tidy political and legal solutions is
admirable, it is not always feasible or completely desirable. Europe is an
incredibly complex region, and it is naive to believe that all of those com-
plexities can be mitigated by a sweeping document like the Brussels Con-
vention. The limited use of the anti-suit injunction by the British will not
threaten the Brussels Convention as a whole, yet it provides an outlet for
the British to assert their unique British qualities.1 50
149. REDWOOD, supra note 2, at 58.
150. The end. Stop. See supra note 1.
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